Katie: Welcome to the Deep Dive.
James: That's right, yeah, our source here is an article from May 2025. It's called Lockbit Ransomware Unmasked Evolution Tactics and Enterprise Defense.
Katie: Okay.
James: And it really paints Lockbit as potentially the most, let's say, aggressive and technically advanced player out there in the Ransomware as a Service game right now.
Katie: The ran of space, yeah. OK, so let's unpack this. Our goal here, really, is to dive into the source, pull out the key stuff, and help you get a quick handle on LockBit's story, how they operate, and crucially, what the recommended defenses are, all based on this one article's take.
James: Absolutely. And the article, it starts back in 2019. LockBit began pretty typically like a lot of other RAS operations.
Katie: Yeah, at the standard beginnings.
James: But the source really emphasizes how fast they changed, how quickly they evolved.
Katie: So they didn't stay typical for long then.
James: No, not at all. By 2021, the analysis suggests they were already outpacing a lot of their competitors. They rolled out LockBit 2.0.
Katie: OK, 2.0. What was the big deal there?
James: Speed, mostly. Significantly faster encryption, which matters a lot in these attacks. And also better ways to hide from security tools. Evasion.
Katie: Got it. Faster and stealthier.
James: Exactly. Then came 2022 and LockBit 3.0, which sometimes gets called LockBit Black.
Katie: LockBit Black sounds ominous. Did they borrow ideas?
James: They did. The source points out that LockBit Black specifically incorporated techniques from other big names like Black Matter and Black Cat. And this wasn't just random tweaking. It was strategic aimed at making it even harder to detect and also making their malware work better across different systems, different platforms.
Katie: Right. More adaptable. So fast forward to 2025 when this article came out. What can LockBit actually do now, according to this source? What are its capabilities?
James: Well, the article describes really broad capabilities. I mean, really broad. By this point, they can encrypt Windows systems, everything from server 2012 right up to 2022.
Katie: OK, the whole modern Windows server range.
James: Pretty much. And Linux too, especially file servers, Docker containers, that kind of thing.
Katie: What about the big virtual environments like VMware?
James: Oh yeah, definitely. That's a huge target for them. VMware ESXi hosts. The article specifically mentions they can ransom dozens of VMs virtual machines on just one host all at the same time.
Katie: Wow, okay. That's major impact.
James: Huge impact. And they even have some partial macOS support, apparently through beta payloads. So they're really reaching across the typical enterprise landscape.
Katie: So, definitely not just a Windows problem anymore. And the ransomware itself, the actual malicious code, that's become pretty advanced too.
James: Oh, significantly, yeah. According to the source, anyway. It highlights features really built for, you know, stealth and making the attack stick.
Katie: Like what?
James: Well, for instance, the payloads can be password protected. They're modular, so affiliates can customize them for a specific target network.
Katie: Keyword attacks.
James: Exactly. And there's a subtle thing they do checking the system language. They often avoid hitting machines in CIS countries.
Katie: Ah, the classic don't attack your home turf tactic.
James: Kind of, yeah. It helps them avoid some law enforcement heat, presumably. Plus, the payloads have built-in tools for escalating privileges, getting admin rights, for disabling security tools, you know, EDR, anti-virus. And this is a really nasty one. Deleting backups before they encrypt anything.
Katie: Oof. Deleting the backups first. That just takes away your safety net immediately, doesn't it?
James: That's exactly the idea. It pushes you towards paying the ransom. Because recovery becomes so much harder, maybe impossible.
Katie: OK, so we've seen how they evolved, what tools they have. Let's shift to how an attack actually unfolds. The article uses a kill chain model. Can you walk us through that? Starting with initial access, how do they first get in?
James: Yeah, this is super important for defense. Stage one, getting a foot in the door. The source talks about several main ways their affiliates break in. Exploiting known vulnerabilities is a big one.
Katie: specific software flaws, you mean?
James: Exactly. The article actually named some like flaws in paper cut print management software. That's CVE-2023-27350.
Katie: Right. I remember that one.
James: Uh huh. And Citrix ADC vulnerabilities like CDE-2023-4966, also known as Citrix bleed.
Katie: Okay.
James: And even older was like exchange proxy shell. That's CVE-2021-34473. These are flaws in systems often facing the internet.
Katie: So keeping those edge systems patched is just absolutely critical then, step one.
James: Paramount, according to this analysis. Yeah. But it's not the only way in. They also mention weak RDP or VPN credentials.
Katie: Just guessing passwords or buying stolen ones.
James: Yep. Guest or bought from initial access brokers on the dark web. And of course, good old phishing emails designed to trick users into running something like Cobalt Strike.
Katie: OK, so multiple routes in. Once they have that initial foothold, what's stage two?
James: Stage two is privilege escalation and lateral movement. So once they're inside, they don't just sit there. They usually deploy something more powerful, like Cobalt Strike, if they didn't already, or maybe a custom RIT, a remote access Trojan.
Katie: To get better control and start looking around?
James: Precisely. The source describes them dumping credentials, basically stealing usernames and passwords out of the computer's memory. Tools like Mimikatz are famous for this. Right. Then they try to elevate their privileges, get more power. They might use exploits like zero login. That's CVE 2020 1472, a really bad Windows domain controller flaw.
Katie: Yeah, that was huge.
James: Or they just reuse passwords they've already stolen elsewhere on the network. And once they have higher privileges, they move laterally spreading from machine to machine.
Katie: How do they do that, the spreading part?
James: Often using standard Windows tools, things admins use legitimately, like SMB file sharing, WMI, PSE ZEC, things that might not immediately look malicious.
Katie: Clever. And while they're moving around... They're digging in.
James: The article mentions how they actively try to disable security software like EDR. They might even remove legitimate domain admins and create their own hidden admin accounts.
Katie: So they can stay in even if the original entry point is found.
James: Exactly. It's about persistence and control. They're basically trying to take over the keys to the kingdom, become the administrators.
Katie: OK. So they get admin rights. They're moving around. Where do they head next? What are the prime targets inside the network?
James: That brings us to stage three, targeting the crown jewels. The source is pretty clear about what lock-bit affiliates prioritize for maximum pain. Veeam backup servers are high on the list.
Katie: Makes sense. Go after the recovery mechanism.
James: Right. Sometimes they exploit specific Veeam flaws, like CVE202327532, to get in and encrypt or delete the backups. Those VMware ESX hosts we talk about, big targets. Maybe using exploits like CVE2021212072. OK. And of course NAS devices, file servers, anywhere important data is stored.
Katie: Yeah.
James: Especially if they have weak security like open SMB shares or default admin passwords.
Katie: And the goal here isn't just getting to them, it's actively disabling recovery.
James: Exactly. This is where they really execute those pre-encryption steps. Delete the backups, maybe exfiltrate them first, shut down the VM so they can be encrypted properly. It's all about crippling your ability to restore without paying them.
Katie: Which leads neatly into the double extortion aspect. Stage four, data exfiltration.
James: Yes. The article really stresses this. Before encrypting, they steal data. Your sensitive stuff.
Katie: Like what kind of data?
James: Could be anything valuable, really. HR files, intellectual property, financial records, customer databases. They use tools built for moving lots of data, like rClone or FileZilla, or sometimes just uploaded straight to cloud storage they control.
Katie: And the threat is they'll leak it if you don't pay.
James: That's the second layer of extortion. They threaten to publish your stolen data on their leak site, which is usually on the Tor network. This adds enormous pressure, regulatory fines, reputational damage, lawsuits on top of just having your systems locked up.
Katie: Nasty stuff. OK, so they've stolen the data, disabled the backups, then come stage five. Ransomware deployment. The final blow. How do they actually encrypt everything?
James: This source talks about mass deployment. They want speed and scale, often using group policy objects, GPOs, to push the ransomware out to loads of machines at once.
Katie: Using standard Windows admin tools again?
James: Right. Or PZ ZEC for more targeted hits on specific servers. And they use command line options, flags, to trigger specific tactics, like telling the ransomware to run when the machine reboots into safe mode. Why safe mode? It often bypasses security software that only runs in normal Windows mode. It's an evasion technique. They also frequently use WMI Windows management instrumentation to delete volume shadow copies.
Katie: Ah, the local snapshots Windows makes. Another recovery option bites the dust.
James: Exactly. They're very thorough about removing recovery options, cloud backups, local backups, local snapshots. They hit it all.
Katie: And the encryption itself. What method do they use?
James: The source mentions multi-threaded AES, which is standard strong encryption. But the multi-threaded part means it runs fast on modern computers with multiple CPU cores. They target common file types, documents, databases, VMs, everything you need to operate.
Katie: And the result for the poor victim.
James: Systems are locked. You get ransom notes left everywhere, usually text files. They point you to a negotiation portal on the Tor network.
Katie: And the demands.
James: significant, according to the article. Anywhere from, say, $10,000 for a small hit, up to over a million dollars, sometimes much more for large enterprises. The source also notes they might offer a discount if you pay in Monero.
Katie: Because it's harder to trace.
James: Yeah. It offers more privacy than Bitcoin, typically. Makes it tougher for law enforcement to follow the money.
Katie: Wow. That kill chain really lays out how methodical they are. The article also includes a case study, right? A real world example from early 2025.
James: It does, yeah. It walked through a breach at a mid-sized company. It's a really good illustration of this whole process in action.
Katie: So how did they get into that company? What was the entry point?
James: Remember that paper cut vulnerability we mentioned earlier, CDE 2023, 27, 350? Yeah. That was it? They got in through an old, unpatched, paper-cut server facing the internet, exactly like the playbook describes.
Katie: A known flaw just waiting to be exploited. What happened after they got that initial access?
James: Pretty much textbook lockbit, according to the source. They dumped credentials, moved laterally through the network, compromised admin accounts, and fairly quickly got domain admin rights. Full control.
Katie: And once they had domain admin, what did they hit?
James: the critical stuff. The source says the company's Veeam backups got encrypted. Their VMware ESXE hosts were locked down. VMs unusable.
Katie: So recovery crippled again. Did they steal data in this case, too?
James: They did. About 200 gigabytes, according to the source, exfiltrated before the encryption kicked off.
Katie: Then the final ransomware attack.
James: Lockbit 3.0 deployed across the network. And the article specifically mentions they used those advanced techniques, safe mode encryption, using WMI to delete shadow copies, just like we discussed.
Katie: What was the ransom demand?
James: A million dollars.
Katie: Yeah.
James: And they apparently showed the company proof they had their data to really turn the screws.
Katie: So what happened? Did the company pay?
James: The source says they ended up negotiating and paying $600,000.
Katie: OK, so they paid a lot. Did things go back to normal quickly then?
James: Well, this is a key point. Even after paying, the article states their operations were still down for a whole week.
Katie: Wow. So paying isn't a magic undo button. There's still a significant disruption in recovery time.
James: Exactly. It was a huge financial hit, obviously. But the week of downtime underlines that recovery is complex, even with a decryption key.
Katie: That case study really drives home the real world impact. Okay, so given this detailed picture of how LockBit operates, what does the article advise for defense? What can organizations actually do?
James: Now the source offers guidance on a couple of levels strategically for the CISOs the leadership. The message is really you have to own this risk. See a lock bit not just as an IT problem but as a serious business threat. And the article urges focusing effort on specific high impact defense areas.
Katie: OK. And what about tactically for the security teams the IT folks on the ground.
James: The advice there is very direct. It boils down to really strong cybersecurity hygiene executed with discipline. Rigorous patching is number one.
Katie: So should those internet-facing systems.
James: Absolutely. Close those common entry doors. Then hardening configurations, getting rid of default passwords, securing services properly, reducing the overall attack surface.
Katie: Makes sense.
James: Network segmentation is also key. If they do get in, segmentation can stop them or at least slow them down from moving laterally across the whole network.
Katie: Attaining the blast radius, basically.
James: Exactly. Improving credential hygiene is huge, strong, unique passwords everywhere and multi-factor authentication, MFA, wherever humanly possible. That makes credential theft much less effective. Constant monitoring is also stressed, looking for signs of lateral movement, suspicious admin activity, and having incident response plans ready and practiced.
Katie: And backups.
James: Crucial. Not just having backups, but testing them regularly, making sure they're actually working, they're secure, and ideally, they're isolated offline or offsite so the ransomware can't reach them.
Katie: So it sounds like a lot of it is about mastering the fundamentals, but doing them really, really well, consistently.
James: That's definitely a core message in the article's defense section. But it does also mention the role specific tools can play. It names Vicarious VRX, for example.
Katie: OK, how does that fit in?
James: Well, the source describes it as a tool that helps provide more automated, real-time defense against these kinds of tactics.
Katie: In what way?
James: According to the article, it helps with identifying the specific vulnerabilities LockBit likes to exploit, providing protection for key assets, helping spot that lateral movement we talked about. defending against specific attack techniques, and generally giving organizations better visibility and, importantly, speed, helping them react faster than the attackers can move.
Katie: Right, getting ahead of that kill chain.
James: The?
Katie: Visibility and speed.
James: That seems to be the angle presented in the source, yeah.
Katie: OK. So as we wrap up our dive into this article, what's the final takeaway? What's the closing perspective from this source?
James: Well, the article is pretty realistic, I'd say. It doesn't portray LockBit as like some unstoppable mythical beast. It sees them as a very professional, very opportunistic extortion business.
Katie: A business, yeah.
James: A business that profits by exploiting really basic gaps in security. patching, weak credentials, flat networks where they can move easily. Their affiliates are described as fast, adaptable, and they have resources.
Katie: That still sounds pretty daunting.
James: It is challenging, for sure. But the source actually offers an optimistic counterpoint, too. It strongly suggests this is a solvable problem.
Katie: OK. How so?
James: By really doubling down on those discipline defense practices we talked about, hardening systems across the board, and using the right tools to get that crucial visibility and speed. The article basically says organizations can disrupt the Loctite kill chain. They can significantly lower their risk. It frames it as an adversarial game. And in this game, speed and visibility are your best weapons against threats like these.
Katie: That makes total sense. It's not just about having defenses, but how quickly you can see and react.
James: Precisely. That's the edge.
Katie: So we've journeyed through this source's view of Lockbit from their rapid evolution through that detailed attack kill chain, the sobering case study, and finally the defense strategies it recommends. Hopefully this deep dive has given you a fast but solid understanding of this major threat actor.
James: And more importantly maybe some clarity on the key defensive actions that this analysis highlights as being really necessary.
Katie: Absolutely. It really shines a light on the speed and frankly, the professionalism of these groups, but also on how they often rely on fundamental known weaknesses, which kind of leaves us with the final thought for you to chew on building on that idea of preparation and speed from the source. Given how fast actors like LockBit move and how they exploit known gaps, how ready are you really? Is your organization prepared to operate at the speed and with the visibility needed to actually stay ahead?
James: That's the critical question, isn't it? It really defines resilience today.
